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With the popularization of cloud computing, more and more concerns about the privacy
and security issues are arising. Existing approaches on encrypted domain processing and
trusted computing have been shown useful in enabling privacy-preserving computation,
but have been found limited, impractical and expensive. Instead, this report focuses on
another approach of anonymous routing between distributed untrusted devices. We ana-
lyze the potential channels of sensitive information leakage and propose a solution that
achieves a strong guarantee of anonymity. We study how to execute distributed appli-
cations written in the popular MapReduce framework and Spark on an untrusted cloud.
We design and implement our solution to add a mix phase/stage to enhance the existing
Hadoop MapReduce and Spark framework. The evaluation shows it is feasible to run
Spark jobs in our design with no change to the application logic. The performance cost
of this privacy-preserving execution vary from different types of jobs.
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Since late 2000s, cloud computing has become a disruptive trend on current IT industry
and research communities. Cloud computing provides massive computation and storage
capacity which enables users to deploy applications without infrastructure investment and
at relatively low prices. Organizations and individuals are increasingly realizing that by
simply tapping into the cloud, they can enjoy a wide-range of benefits, such as reduced
monetary cost, high scalability, high availability, ubiquitous access etc. The different
types of cloud computing services are commonly referred to as Software as a Service
(SaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS) and Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS). Successful
examples of cloud services are Amazon AWS [1], Google App Engine [2] and Microsoft
Windows Azure [3].
However, cloud computing faces a series of striking challenges such as security and
privacy issues. This is due to the outsourcing nature of cloud computing where data and
applications are managed by the cloud service providers but out of the data owners’ con-
trol. An untrusted cloud server can perform several malicious activities on the physical
or virtual machines, including data breach, data manipulation and dishonest computa-
tion [7, 8, 45, 49]. For example, [53] demonstrated that confidential information can be
extracted through side-channel leakage via virtual machines (VMs) resided on the same
physical machine. On the other hand, since data and computation are distributed over a
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great number of nodes which are connected to the internet, an untrusted server can eaves-
drop the network flow and capture the transmissions, leading to another big concern about
information leakage.
In order to eliminate various security and privacy threats in cloud computing, a few
defensive solutions are proposed these years. For example, encryption scheme is a sim-
ple way to provide confidentiality of data both in motion and at rest in untrusted cloud
servers [38, 62]. One line of research work on the solutions is encrypted domain process-
ing [54], which aims to encrypt the data in a proper form such that the cloud server can
compute on the encrypted data on demand without revealing any plaintext information.
Researchers have developed multiple cryptographic primitives to support it, such as fully
homomorphic encryption (FHE) [33], somewhat homomorphic encryption (SHE) [17].
On the other hand, integrity for code and data in a specific application can be guaranteed
by isolating the unit of computation into a hardware-isolated environment using stan-
dard trusted computing primitives [26, 67], such as Trust Platform Module (TPM) [12].
However, such approaches require users to trust a certain amount of hardware which is
physically under control of the cloud providers. Until now, the secure hardware has not
commonly used since it is usually expensive and relatively slow.
However, although we protect the confidentiality and integrity of data by the tech-
niques as encrypted domain processing and trusted computing, it is still possible that
sensitive information leakage happens when data delivered on the network. For example,
if an untrusted cloud server is able to monitor the whole data flow distributed in a certain
set of computation nodes, it can analyse and discern more underlying information even
if the data is in ciphertext. This kind of attack come up with different cases and brings a
serious consequences as described in [20, 37]. We consider MapReduce as an example,
which is a famous programming model in cloud computing. Suppose a semi-honest serv-
er is able to keep track of the data flow between Mapper and Reducer, it can get to learn
the source (which Mapper) and destination (which Reducer) of each unit of data. There-
fore, even if the data is in ciphertext, the server can still obtain some valuable information
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due to this MapReduce semantics. To take WordCount application as a concrete example,
by tracing the source and destination of each tuple, it can get frequency of occurrences
(or distribution) of every different keyword (whether encrypted or not) in the reduce side,
which provides chances for adversary to infer the contents of a file. Similarly, the in/out
degree of vertices in a graph algorithm, such as PageRank, is a form of sensitive informa-
tion revealing the structure of the whole graph, which could be obtained via tracing the
tuples.
In this work, we aim to eliminate such kind of information leakage in cloud com-
putation model like MapReduce. Researches on security and privacy protection in the
MapReduce framework have commenced for several years. Most of the work are trying
to solve the problem on how to prevent unauthorized user or untrusted server from at-
taining the sensitive data by encryption [19], access control [51], differential privacy [55]
etc. With a hybrid cloud setting described in [65, 68], one could properly segregate the
data so as to pushing non-sensitive data to the public cloud while keeping sensitive da-
ta in the trusted private cloud. Although these research work can solve some existed
problems, they are not designed for information leakage problem mentioned as above.
In this thesis, we propose a method to anonymise the routing of the network flow in the
MapReduce framework, while preserving its original semantics. In our model, we as-
sume the cloud server is honest-but-curious (sometimes also called the passive attack or
semi-honest model). That is, it is permitted to observe the computation session, behaving
honestly in relaying communication between computation units, but is curious to discern
additional information about the user’s data.
We propose a new phase between any Map and Reduce phases, namely, Mix phase,
to support anonymising the route. The features of that phase is to randomly reorder and
change the appearance for a batch of input data, thus prevents tracing back output to input.
The untraceability mix network is useful for those network applications requiring privacy
against traffic analysis such as electric voting and e-mail, as described in [23]. In our
design, all the output tuples from Map are first delivered into a Mixer (a task running Mix
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functions), after being mixed properly, they will be shuffled to the specific Reducer. The
proof shows an idle Mixer satisfies the best degree of anonymity, eliminates the possibility
for a passive attacker to gain advance in learning sensitive information.
We name our solution as ”Map-Mix-Reduce” and apply it into Hadoop [5] and Spark
[6]. Hadoop MapReduce is a software framework for easily writing applications which
process vast amounts of data in parallel on large clusters of commodity hardware in a
reliable, fault-tolerant manner. In contrast to Hadoop’s two-stage disk-based MapReduce
paradigm, Spark positioned as a fast and general engine for Big Data, which generalizes
the MapReduce model and its in-memory primitives. In Spark, its job is divided into
multiple stages and the output from the former stage is shuffled to the next stage. Due
to the differences in the definition of paradigm between Hadoop and Spark, we propose
two different designs for the Mix phase/stage and implement it in Spark. In our design,
we assume the data owner choose to encrypt the data before computation. However,
all the functions including cryptographical operations run under the control of untrusted
servers, which deactivate the Mixer. To prevent it happening, we propose to utilize the
trusted computation primitives on critical computation unit, which provides an isolate
execution environment for privacy-preserving computation. The experiments shows that
the amount of data shuffled is increased due to the additional stage. Besides, for different
Spark applications with different properties (e.g., shuffle-intensive, map-intensive), the
runtime increases to different extent because of the different influences of the additional
Mix.
The remainder of this report is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we investigate the
security and privacy issues in cloud computing. An overview of current solutions in the
literatures is also presented. In Chapter 3, we provides the overview of the MapReduce
framework and the mix network, as well as the details in designing our Map-Mix-Reduce
model. We continue the work by looking into the extension on the Spark platform in
Chapter 4. We provides the implementation and evaluations details in Chapter 5. Finally,





The recent development of cloud computing has shown prospect to reshape the current
way of IT infrastructure. Among all the benefits of cloud computing, the most attractive
one is that offers customer a more flexible way to store and compute their sources on
demand. Rather than maintaining a large and expensive IT hardware, data owner can
utilize the resources without up-front investment and with high elasticity (i.e., having the
resource allocated/de-allocated on demand), high scalability (i.e., can be easily expanded
to large scales in order to handle rapid increase in service demand) and low operating cost
(i.e., free tenants from the complex tasks by managing infrastructure resources).
Even though cloud computing is envisioned as a promising service platform for the
Next Generation Internet, the striking security and privacy challenges has become a majr
barrier for its broader adoption in practice. Different from the traditional computing mod-
el which users have full control of their data storage and computation, cloud computing
requires the data owner to delegate the managements for the physical machines, network
and other related equipment to the cloud service provider, while only retain part of con-
trol by himself. Therefore, the secrecy of data storage and the correctness of computation
could be compromised due to the lack of the control. For example, malicious insider threat
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is initiated by users who are already in the network, which involves stealing of confiden-
tial or commercially valuable information, or the sabotage of computer systems [27, 39].
Moreover, public cloud also suffers from outside attacks. For instance, confidential in-
formation can be extracted through side-channel information leakage across VMs resided
on the same physical machine [53]. In recent two years, the news expose that NSA has
secretly tapped into Yahoo! and Google data centers as well as telecommunication com-
panies to collect privacy information [9].
In general, the security issues can be classified into two main categories. Cloud stor-
age security refers to ensuring the integrity of outsorced data stored at untrustworthy cloud
server. Cloud computation security refers to checking the correctness of the outsourced
computation performed by untrustworthy cloud servers.
2.2 Secure Computing on Cloud
2.2.1 Encrypted Domain Processing
Remote and cloud storage is ubiquitous and widely used for outsourcing data to reduce
operational costs. However, the remote server cannot be fully trusted due to the insider
threat and outside hackers with root rights, who have full access to the server and even
data in plain. Therefore, how to store sensitive data in a secure way on an untrusted server
has addressed much attention.
A very key component of protecting information confidentiality would be encryption.
Encryption ensures that only the right people (people who knows the key) can read the
data both in motion and at rest. In such an approach, the data is encrypted before storing to
the cloud services and is decrypted after being retrieved into the trusted local environment.
However, the cloud introduces new challenges due to the cost of moving and processing
big data. This means we need to look at the mechanisms of processing encrypted data in
cloud without compromising confidentiality. A number of researches have looked at a new
form of encryption scheme, called homomorphic encryption. It is a form of encryption
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which allows specific types (addition or multiplication) of computations to be carried out
on ciphertext and generate an encrypted result which, when decrypted, matches the result
of operations performed on the plaintext.
Among these schemes, the one supports both addition and multiplication is known as
fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), proposed by Gentry [33] in 2009. FHE is expected
to be applied to various areas including cloud computing, and a number of improvements
have been proposed in the recent work ( [16–18]). Although FHE is of great theoretical
significance, existing schemes are very computationally expensive [34]. It is not practical
to apply FHE to very small-scale or data intensive computations.
As a compromise, there have been many works on designing homomorphic encryp-
tion schemes such that certain restricted kinds of computation can be done on ciphertext.
Partially Homomorphic Encryption (PHE) schemes can only support simple operations
such as addition or multiplication on encrypted data. Therefore, the application of PHE
are very limited. For example, typical applications like electronic voting and e-cash use
additively homomorphic encryption like Paillier cryptosystem [47]. Besides, OPES [11]
is an order-preserving encryption scheme and Elgamal’s cryptosystem [32] is for multi-
plication. CryptDB [50] is a system that takes a purely cryptographic approaches backed
by SQL database, showing the practicality of using partially homomorphic encryption
schemes such as OPES, Paillier, searchable encryption, etc. These encryption schemes
are more suitable for database processing in both performance and implementation com-
plexity. MONOMI [61] is an improvement upon CryptDB supporting more complex
queries, with a special focus on efficient analytical query processing. However, both of
them employ different encryption functions to support different operators, thus they can
not deal with complex multiple operations.
It is coming to attention in recent research for achieving a somewhat homomorphic en-
cryption (SHE) scheme [15,29]. They allow a limited depth of operations to be performed.
Although SHE can only support a limited number of both addition and multiplication, it
is much faster and more compact than FHE. The construction is indeed very useful in
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practice, specially in order to provide security in the scenario of cloud computing. SHE is
important also in the private information retrieval (PIR) protocols [25], which can be seen
as a building block to the solution for the privacy problem that emerges when we give our
data to the cloud.
Encryption reduces security and privacy threats by hiding all the information about
the plaintext. However, it makes possible for data consumer to search on them. To over-
come it, the searchable encryption (SE) is proposed to support the fullest possible search
functionality on the server side without decryption and keep the data confidentiality. The
main techniques for SE are searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) [22, 35, 60] and pub-
lic key encryption with keyword search (PKES) [10, 13, 14]. The notion of provably
secure searchable encryption is first given in 2000 by Song et al. in [60], they propose
the first practical scheme for searching in encrypted data which allows sequential scan.
The scheme is later improved by Chang and Curtmola et al. in [22, 28]. Shi et al. [59]
propose a scheme that can create trapdoors for a conjunction of range queries over multi-
ple attributes. Kamara et al. [38] introduce a cryptographic cloud storage service that, by
combining techniques of searchable encryption, attribute-based encryption and proof of
storage, enables the cloud to search on the encrypted data without leaking its information
while allowing users to verify the integrity of the data at any time.
2.2.2 Trusted Computing
One way to provide code integrity as well as data integrity and secrecy for a specific ap-
plication is to isolate the unit of computation into a hardware-isolated environment using
standard trusted computing primitives available in existing CPUs, such as Trust Platform
Module (TPM) [12]. TPM is specially for remote attestation, binding and sealing. It can
offer facilities for the secure generation of cryptographic keys, and limitation of their use,
in addition to a random number generator. It is safe for all encryption/decryption being
done in TPM, since security is pushing down to the hardware level conjunction with soft-
ware, providing more protection than a software-only solution. Security researches focus
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on exploring an execution model designed to execute small blocks of code with the small-
est possible Trusted Computing Base (TCB) [56], in which each block is termed as Piece
of Application Logic (PAL) [44].
Many existing techniques has been proposed for trusted computing. Some of them
are with large TCB, such as CloudVisor [67] and Overshadow [24], whereas Flicker [44]
and TrustVisor [43] reduce the TCB at the cost of performance. Flicker is an architecture
that allows a PAL to execute in complete isolation from other software while trusting
only a tiny TCB that is orders of magnitude smaller than a hypervisor. TrustVisor is a
special-purpose hypervisor which utilizes the TPM’s Platform Configuration Registers
to generate a TPM-based attestation, providing code and data integrity. Minibox [42]
enhances a TrustVisor-like hypervisor and provides security security for both OS and the
applications (PAL).
Another line of work is advanced hardware-based techniques, including Bastion [21]
and Intel SGX [46], which provide a hardware protected secure modes where applications
can be executed at hardware speed. However, since secure hardware is usually costly,
relatively slow, and supports only a limited amount of secure memory and storage, it is
hardly qualified as building block for cloud computing which requires cost efficiency,
high performance and scalability.
2.2.3 Data Segregation
While most of the researches focus on cryptographic and trusted computation approaches,
there are increasing growth of work concentrated on the data segregation approaches over
the hybrid clouds. Organizational data often involves both sensitive and non-sensitive
information, e.g., an organization’s filesystem may contain general (non-sensitive) files
mixed with confidential business data. Also, many datasets for analytical tasks such as
network logs, email archives and healthcare records may involve data from public sources
mixed with sensitive private data. The idea is that the data owner can keep sensitive data in
private cloud while pushing non-sensitive data to the public cloud which is not under his
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control. This setting is called hybrid cloud and researchers address more on the protection
of sensitive data flow in the public cloud.
Data segregation model is not commonly supported by today’s data-intensive comput-
ing frameworks. Ko et al. [41] propose HybrEx which partitions data and computations
in four execution models over a hybrid cloud according to some data labels similar to tag-
ging. Sedic [68] prelabeles the input data which is then replicated to both the public and
private clouds, but with sensitive portions sanitized in the public cloud. However, Sedic
has limitations in terms of flexibility, since the reduce can only happen in the private cloud
while wasting the public cloud resources. Besides, Sedic does not naturally support com-
plex MapReduce computation involving chained or iterative MapReduce. In [66], Zhang
et.al propose a more general and secure framework as well as overcome the problem in
Sedic, that is, tagged-MapReduce. They design to segregate data with tagging policy
and distribute them to two clouds separately with a general security framework to analyze
what kind of security leaks can occur through execution in the hybrid cloud. It also pushes
more work to the public cloud while reducing the inter-cloud communication.
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Chapter 3
Anonymous Routing in MapReduce
3.1 Overview
3.1.1 MapReduce
The MapReduce framework was originally developed at Google [31] and has been widely
adopted for large-scale data analysis. It is a framework for performing distributed com-
putation across huge datasets over large clusters of commodity machines. MapReduce is
used over hundreds of companies such as Yahoo!, Google, Facebook and IBM. In addi-
tion, many communities and universities are providing MapReduce cluster for research
purpose and developing open-source project to expand the framework.
Conceptually, MapReduce consists of two main stages: map and reduce. A MapRe-
duce program usually splits the input dataset into chunks which are processed by the map
tasks in a completely parallel manner. The framework sorts and combines the outputs of
the maps, which are then transferred to the reduce tasks. The framework takes charge of
scheduling, monitoring and ensuring fault tolerance. Users are usually required to pro-
vide a map and a reduce function. We also refer to such two operations as instances or
computation units, which could be scheduled to run on any computation node.
In MapReduce framework, the basic unit of dataset is a 〈key, value〉 pair where each
key and value are binary strings. The input data to MapReduce algorithms is represented
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as a set of 〈key, value〉 pairs. A map function takes as input a single 〈key, value〉 pair,
and produces as output a set of intermediate 〈key, value〉 pairs, i.e.,
map(〈k, v〉)→ {〈k1, v1〉, 〈k2, v2〉, . . . , 〈km, vm〉}
The reduce stage only begins after all the maps finish. A reduce function aggregates
all the intermediate 〈key, value〉 pairs associated with the same key and outputs another
(possibly smaller) set of 〈key, value〉 pairs, i.e.,
reduce({〈k, v1〉, . . . , 〈k, vn〉})→ {〈k, w1〉, . . . , 〈k, wn′〉}
Between map and reduce, there is a shuffling stage whereby all the tuples associated with
the same key will be sent to the same reducer. This stage influences the efficiency most
and occurs automatically by the underlying system. Therefore, it is easy for a program-
mer who has no experience on distributed system to develop the program running on
MapReduce cluster.
3.1.2 Hadoop Overview
Apache Hadoop is an open-source implementation of MapReduce and has been widely
used in industry [4]. The core consists of the Distributed File System (HDFS) and the
MapReduce engine. The HDFS is a distributed file system which supports huge amount
of data storage across the cluster nodes, providing very high availability and bandwidth
access to the application’s data. Above HDFS is the MapReduce engine where the work is
divided into many small pieces of tasks and each of which can be executed on any node in
the cluster. In most instances, the MapReduce framework and HDFS are deployed on the
same set of cluster nodes, by which the system can schedule the tasks efficiently according
to the position of data stored. This method helps to minimise the communication cost and


















Figure 3.1: High level overview of Hadoop MapReduce workflow.
Typically, the inputs of MapReduce are loaded from HDFS, where the files are evenly
stored in a redundant fashion across multiple machines to ensure their durability to failure
and high availability to parallel applications. There is no priority among the mappers,
therefore, they can process any input files. Execution of a Hadoop computation (or job)
consists of running multiple map and reduce tasks over the cluster, in a parallel man-
ner. Each map task takes as input a file block (typically 64 MB in size) and applies the
user-defined map function on it. The output is partitioned and written to r local files,
where r is the number of reduce tasks. Given a 〈key, value〉 pair, the partitioner class
determines to which partition (and hence to which reduce task) it belongs to. Thus the
intermediate key space is divided into several subsets. By default, Hadoop employs a
HashPartitioner() which computes a hash value for the key and assigns the parti-
tion based on this result. Users can also implement their own partition functions. Each
mapper may emit 〈key, value〉 pairs to any partition; all values for the same key are al-
ways reduced together regardless of which mapper they output from.
Once all map task complete, the jobtracker will notify all the reduce tasks, each of
which then copies the designated partition file from every mapper. The copied files from
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each map task are internally merge-sorted to a single file in the reduce side, on which the
user-defined reduce function runs. Each reducer receives a key as well as an iterator over
all the values associated with it. The values are returned by the iterator in an undefined
order. The reducer will go through all these values, performing the user-specified compu-
tations. The whole process of transferring data from the map tasks to the reduce tasks is
known as shuffling. This is the only communication step in MapReduce and it is handled
by the Hadoop platform automatically. An individual map task does not exchange any
data with another map task, nor do the reduce tasks. The output is written back to the
underlying distributed file system (HDFS typically).
3.1.3 Mix Network
Anonymity is a subdiscipline of information hiding, required in a number of network ap-
plications, such as electronic voting and e-mail. The concept of mix network is motivated
by the need for anonymity in network communications by Chaum [23], based on cryp-
tography and permutation. It is proposed as a multistage system that accepts an input
batch and produces an output batch containing the cryptographically transformed, per-
muted input batch. The change of appearance and the random reordering of the batch by
the mix prevents adversary from tracing back output to input, hence achieving intractabil-
ity. This is useful for those network applications requiring privacy against traffic analysis.
In [52, 58], they provide survey in depth on different topologies of mix networks, includ-
ing cascade and free-route.
As shown in Figure 3.2, the main component of a mix network is mixer, performing
on a batch of inputs from senders. Typically, inputs arrive at different times are forward
in parallel to the next destination (receiver or mixer). This process is known as batching.
The mixing operations involve a cryptographic transformation using either encryption or
decryption, followed by a permutation on the batch. The cryptographic operations change
the appearance of the input. The batching and permutation phase is to hide the order of









Figure 3.2: The topology of a mix network.
if the batch size is s, by observing one unit of the output batch from a successful mixer,
the probability for an attacker to guess correctly the correspondence with an input is 1/s.
Hence we know an increase in the number of inputs to the mixer increases the anonymity
provided.
Typically, a mix network consists of several interconnected mixers (or stages). Each
of them performs the same mixing function on the input, and output the mixed batch to the
next destination. Figure 3.3 shows the typical cascade mix network. It consists of mixers
connecting in a fixed, sequential order. In a cascade mix network, all the inputs traverse
the same path. The first mixer receives the inputs from senders, mixes and forwards them
to the next stage. The rest of mixers repeat the same process until the last one output
to the corresponding receivers. The design of the cascade topology is to guarantee the
robustness of anonymity, that is, even if some of the mixers are compromised, the mix
network can still provide anonymity to some extent. In cascade mix network, anonymity
is dependent on the batch size s and the number of mixers.
In the design of Chaum’s mix network, the encryption and decryption on one mes-
sage is taken into consideration. Assume there are k mixers {M1, . . . ,Mk} arranged
in sequence, each mixer Mj (j is the index of the mixer) generates a public/private
key pair and publishes its public key pkj . To anonymously send a message m, the
sender encrypts the message with all public keys and publishes the resulting ciphertext
Encpk1(Encpk2(. . . , Encpkk(m), . . . )) (also called onion encryption) on a bulletin board.
Lj is defined to be the list of all submitted ciphertexts. For j = 1, . . . , k, the jth mixer Mj
takes Lj−1 as input, removes the outermost layer of the onion encryption using its private












Figure 3.3: The cascade mix network.
has decrypted and shuffled the message, it can publish the original plaintext as the final
output.
This kind of decryption mix network has a lot of weakness. For instance, since the
size of the encrypted onion decreases as the mixers are traversed, the sender is able to
trace the message by observing the appearances changed in motion. Besides, the sender
is required to encrypt a layer for each mixer which costs a lot. At the same time, the
decryption needs to be performed in a predetermined sequence, which is restrictive. To
overcome these weaknesses, the re-encryption mix network was proposed. Park et al. [48]
introduced re-encryption mix network, where the mixers use the homomorphic property
of the cryptosystem to re-randomize the ciphertexts instead of decryption. On the other
hand, Sako and Kilian [57] introduced the first universally verifiable mix network based
on the protocol of Park’s work. Their work allows each mix server to prove in zero-
knowledge that its output is a re-encryption and permutation of its input.
3.2 Map-Mix-Reduce Framework
3.2.1 Attack Model
In this work, we consider a semi-honest/honest-but-curious/passive attack model. A pas-
sive adversary observes the computation session and storage, behaving honestly in re-
laying communication between computation units, but is curious to discern additional
information about the client’s data.
A semi-honest adversary can leverage the channels such as data access patterns and
timing patterns while passively observing the computation. Data access pattern is from the
evidence that each MapReduce job consists of a sequence of writes followed by reads to
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the file system. Map units write the intermediate results and reduce units read these values.
Even if the intermediate results happen to be of the same size, the passive adversary
can observe which blocks are written out by a map instance and which reduce instance
reads them. This information is disclosed by the adversary who observes data accesses
in the distributed file system. In the WordCount example, the ith map instance processes
words in the file Fi, and the intermediate tuples are sorted before being fed to the reduce
instances. By observing the output from mapi and mapj , which are grouped in the same
reducer, the adversary can learn the word wi in file Fi is the same as (or close to) the word
wj in file Fj .
The task of the MapReduce shuffle phase is to sort and group intermediate 〈key, value〉
tuples from outputs of the mapper, and pass them to the reduce instances. The reduce op-
erations execute in a certain time order, say in the sorted order by key. If so, the adversary
can easily correlate the sequence of tuples processed with the order after sorting, there-
by leaking more information. In other words, the adversary can correlate which blocks
written by map instances are read by which reduce instances, thereby enabling further
attacks.
In a mix network, the adversary can perform traffic analysis in order to conjecture the
correspondence between the input and output in batch. By observing the input to a cascade
mix network, the adversary could get time and access pattern information. However, after
processed by the mixer, the adversary is hardly to trace the dataflow and the robustness
can be achieved by increasing the batch size.
3.2.2 Main Ideas
Our main idea is, instead of the original two phases (map and reduce), we incorporate a
mix network into the shuffling phase so as to hide the linkage information between the
mapper and reducer. In order to achieve a strong level of security in the distributed execu-
tion of map/reduce tasks while preserving the original semantic, we design an important








Figure 3.4: The Map-Mix-Reduce framework.
Reduce and the high-level overview of its workflow is shown in Figure 3.4. The goal of
the mixer phase is same as that in the mix network, that is, to disable a passive attacker
infer any useful information from the dataflow.
However, if we just have one mixer to process all the data, it will become a bottleneck
and hence introduce large overhead. Due to the limited capacity to process data and
network bandwidth, we design to have multiple mixers working in parallel. However,
in this case, more information would be leaked compared with one mixer. In detail, by
eavesdropping the output from one mixer, the attacker can infer which mapper a given
tuple comes from more precisely, due to the decreased input size. From Section 3.1.3 we
know that the degree of anonymity is positively associated with the size of input batch. In
order to reduce the risk, we propose to have multiple layers of mixers performing several
rounds of mixing operations.
There are two direct threats in the original MapReduce platform. In the first case, the
adversary can observe the data as it shuffles from the mapper to the reducer. If data is
unencrypted, this leads to a direct breach in data confidentiality. Secondly, the attacker
can monitor the computation of each map or reduce instance directly, giving no guarantee
about the data integrity. To address these threats, we assume two baseline methods as a
starting point in our solution. First, the platform employs trusted computation primitives
to securely execute each map and reduce functions. Second, the input/output of each op-
eration is encrypted with a standard semantically secure encryption scheme (e.g., using
one of the standard symmetric key mechanisms). Therefore, in our Map-Mix-Reduce
model, we propose that map and reduce instances need to be executed in tamper-proof


























Figure 3.5: Our design.
and encrypted only in a TPM-attested computation unit. To support this design, the mix-
er should be able to sort the intermediate tuples, group them by keys and deliver to the
specific reducer. However, it is not possible to group tuples when they are under seman-
tically secure scheme, thus we need a mixer running decryption and sorting in a trusted
primitive.
3.2.3 Our Design
For the proposed method shown in Figure 3.5, we divide it into three phases, namely,
map, mix and reduce. Before giving the description of each phase, we first define three
primitives which will be called in the corresponding phase.
19
Map: The input of map are some encrypted files. At first, map decrypts them and
represents them as 〈key, value〉 tuples. Then it performs user-defined map function on
these tuples to produce a number of intermediate 〈key, value〉 pairs as output, denoted
as {〈key1, value1〉, 〈key2, value2〉, . . . , 〈keym, valuem〉}. Then it encrypt each pair using
probabilistic encryption scheme E under secret key k and produce encrypted tuples
{〈Ek(key1), Ek(value1)〉, 〈Ek(key2), Ek(value2)〉, . . . , 〈Ek(keym), Ek(valuem)〉}
as the output.
Mix: The mix takes a list of encrypted tuples as input, which is the output of map
above. At first, mix re-arranges the tuples by using pseudo random generator to disrupt the
order of the tuples. Then it decrypts and re-encrypts them using probabilistic encryption
scheme under a new key k′. The output is in the form of list(〈Ek′(key), Ek′(value)〉).
Reduce: The input of reduce is a list of encrypted tuples from mixer by key k′.
In reduce primitive, it first decrypts them into a list of 〈key, value〉 tuples in plaintext
and then performs user-defined reduce function to aggregate the pairs associated with the
same key and output another set of 〈key, value〉 pairs. The output would be re-encrypted
on demand.
Map phase: The input file of user-defined map function is encrypted by users, which
is called pre-processing. At first, map task will invoke the map primitive executed in
the trusted environment. After collecting the output, it performs partitioning by hash the
Ek(key) in each tuple into one of the partitions {p1, p2, . . . , pn}, where n represents the
total number of mixers in the first layer. The partitions are stored in the local disk.
Mix phase: We denote each mixer an index i, where i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. After convinced
by the jobtracker that all the map tasks have been completed, a mixer will set up several
copy threads to pull the data of the corresponding partition {pi} from all the mappers. Due

































Figure 3.6: The internal overview of two-round mix phase.
(i.e., hundreds of megabytes), it will invoke a mix primitive call. This is called sub-round
and need to be done for logS N times, with N representing the total number of tuples a
mixer needs to be tackled with. Upon the mix call return, the output will be partitioned
and copied locally for the next sub-round. We design to have several sub-rounds for mix
phase and usually two is enough, since the size of data processed by one mixer is limited.
After one round (or layer) is done, tuples should be partitioned using hash function on
Ek′(key) and written locally into a specific file. The output is transferred in the network
to the next round.
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The second round of mix phase is a special case of the first round. After collecting
the output from the mixers in the first layer, it invokes a mix call. Upon return, a second
re-encryption needs to be performed in the trusted environment, which is to change the
form of probabilistic encryption to the form of deterministic encryption in the domain of
key. This is to ensure the tuples associated with the same key will be hashed to the same
partition, thus will be delivered to the same reducer. The internal detail of two rounds of
mixes is shown in Figure 3.6.
Reduce phase: After all mix tasks complete, reduce workers set up multiple copy
threads to pull the data from network. For the tuples with identical key, it will invoke
a reduce call in the trusted environment. The output from the primitive call is kept en-
crypted and post-processing (e.g., decryption) is done by users.
Encryption scheme: Data is encrypted with a private-key encryption scheme, name-
ly AES. Beside strong security guarantee, AES’s high performance is well-suited to
data-intensive applications. Storage overhead of AES ciphertext is small: addition of
at most one AES block per plaintext. Even without hardware acceleration, AES offers
high throughput in hundreds of MB per second, which can be further improved by us-
ing parallelizable mode (CTR) and taking advantage of numerous cores available in the
cluster environment.
Minimizing TCB: Our system has small TCB and necessitates small changes to legacy
Hadoop applications. In our design, data is encrypted so that a significant amount of codes
that do not operate on the data content (codes that perform I/O, for example) is outside
of TCB. Specifically, small TCB is the result of moving only operations that compute
on the data content to a trusted execution environment. We observe that most Hadoop
operations are related to I/O and job scheduling, which are oblivious to the data content.
Two exceptions are the shuffling phase requiring equality comparison of keys, and the
execution of map and reduce function that may perform arbitrary computation. Our design
22
is to minimize the TCB and allow the developers easily to port their application into the
trusted environment.
3.2.4 Ideal Mixer
The goal of this work is to hide the correlation between map output with reduce input,
that is, anonymous routing. It also keeps the original semantic of MapReduce, which is
to deliver the tuples to the correct reduce operation. The ideal mixer mixes N tuples, and
can be realised by randomly permute and re-encrypt the tuples, followed by grouping the
tuples to determine a random mapping of the keys to a reducer. We consider the following
simplified variant of mixer.
An ideal mixer takes as input a sequence 〈x1, . . . , xN〉 where each xi ∈ [1, N ]. The
ideal mixer picks a permutation p : [1, N ] → [1, N ] randomly and sends the sequence
〈xp(1), xp(2), . . . , xp(N)〉 to the ideal adversary. Hence, what the ideal adversary can ob-
serve is a random arrangement of a multi-set of N numbers in [1, N ].
Our construction of the ideal mixer is constrained by the limitation that a mixer can
only take in at most T tuples, which can be smaller than N . To overcome this limitation,
we employ a cascaded network of mixer. Note that in practice, the value of T is very large,
for e.g., in the WordCount example, T ≈ 1, 000, 000. Klonowski et al. [40] investigate
the effectiveness of this cascaded network of mixing and show that O(log(N/T )) rounds






Same as Hadoop, Apache Spark is another popular cluster computing platform designed
to have fast speed and general purpose by exploiting in-memory computing and other op-
timizations [6]. With over 460 contributors in last year, it becomes the most active project
in the Apache Software Foundation among Big Data open source projects. Spark extends
the MapReduce model to efficiently support more types of computations, including in-
teractive queries and stream processing [64]. It is first designed for those applications
which reuse a working set of data across multiple parallel operations, including itera-
tive machine learning algorithms. The system is also faster than MapReduce for those
applications running on disk.
One of the main features of Spark is the ability to run computations in memory. Spark
keeps track of the data from each of operators and enables to store them in memory.
Compared to MapReduce, Spark supports a wide range of workload in the same worker
that is usually required to run on distributed systems, including batch application, iterative
algorithm, interactive query and streaming processing. Therefore, Spark makes it easy
















Figure 4.1: The high level overview of Spark framework.
APIs in Python, Java, Scala and SQL as programming interface, makes it easy to program.
Additionally, Spark’s interactive shell (Python or Scala) provides an easy way to learn the
API, helps developer to analyse the dataset interactively as well as modularize the code.
The main programming abstraction in Spark is RDDs (Resilient Distributed Dataset-
s) [63], which represent a collection of items distributed across many work nodes manip-
ulated in parallel. Spark provides many APIs to operate these collections, among which
the two main categories are Transformation and Action. By definition, transformation
operations create a new dataset from existing ones, for example, map(func) passes each
dataset element into a function and returns a new RDD as the output. Action operations
returns a value to the driver program after computation done on the dataset. For example,
reduce(func) aggregates all the elements in the RDD by a function and returns the final
result. More detail of the operations is given in Section 4.1.3.
4.1.2 Runtime Architecture
As shown in Figure 4.1, spark framework adopts the Master/Slave programming model
in distributed computation. In a common Standalone mode, Spark uses a Master daemon
to coordinate the efforts of all the Workers, on which run the Executors. Each Executor
represents a process capable of running tasks and storing RDD data and is lunched once
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Figure 4.2: The overview of execution on Spark application.
protocol and each Worker needs to report the state of available resource to the Master.
The machine which executes the application and creates the corresponding SparkContext
is regard as the Driver node. It runs the Driver process, executes the main() function,
manages the transformations/actions on RDDs and submits the requests for resource to
the Master. The Master takes charge of the resources allocation and creates Executors
in Workers so that the Driver can schedule tasks among those Executors. Similar as a
MapReduce job, each Spark application makes use of the resources in each Worker node,
any of which can run application code in the cluster.
An application refers to a user program built on Spark, which consists of a Driver pro-
gram and Executors on the cluster. Once a client submits an application, a Driver process
is lunched, which requests for the resources from Master or resource manager and creates
a SparkContext object for this program. A SparkContext is the main entry point for Spark
functionality, tells Spark how to access a cluster and can be used to create RDDs and
other important variables on the cluster. Typically, there are two ways to create RDDs:
parallelizing an existing collection in the Driver program, and referencing a dataset in an


















Figure 4.3: Spark runtime space.
fering a Hadoop InputFormat. A Driver process takes charge of converting an application
into multiple units of work, which is Task, and sending them to the Executors. Task is the
smallest unit of work in Spark and a typical user program lunches hundreds or thousands
of individual tasks in parallel. The Driver coordinates those tasks and collects the results
according to the data placement. A Cluster Manager is an external service for acquiring
resources on the cluster (e.g. standalone manager, Mesos, YARN) in both on-premise and
cloud deployments.
As shown in Figure 4.2, a Spark application is converted into a directed graph (DAG)
of individual tasks that get executed within an Executor process on the Workers. The
DAGScheduler is a high-level scheduling layer that implements Stage-oriented schedul-
ing. A stage corresponds to a collection of tasks that all execute the same code, each on
a different subset of the data. It computes a DAG of stages for each job, keeps track of
which RDDs and stage outputs are materialized, and finds a minimal schedule to run the
job. It then submits stages as TaskSets to an underlying TaskScheduler implementation
that runs them on the cluster. Each TaskScheduler schedules tasks for a single SparkCon-
text, that is for a specific application. These TaskSchedulers get sets of tasks submitted to
them from the DAGScheduler for each stage, and are responsible for sending the tasks to
the cluster, running them, retrying if there are failures, and mitigating stragglers.
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Figure 4.3 shows a typical execution sequence (input, operation and output) of a Spark
application.
Input: Spark input RDD is created from some external storage sources, such as local
file, HDFS and any data source supporting Hadoop InputFormat.
Operation: RDD undergoes a sequence of transformations and each provides a
new RDD that feed into the next operation. Transformation specifies the processing de-
pendency DAG among RDDs. The scheduler will perform a topology sort to determine
the execution sequence of the DAG, tracing all the way back to the source nodes, or node
that represents a cached RDD. In Spark, each stage contains a sequence of transformations
that can be completed.
There are two forms of dependency. Narrow dependency means all partitions of a
parent RDD will be consumed by a single child RDD and a child RDD is allowed to have
multiple parent RDDs. It contains the operators such as Map, FlatMap, Filter and Sample.
Wide dependencies (e.g. SortByKey, ReduceByKey, GroupByKey, CogroupByKey, Join,
Cartesian) means a parent RDD will be splitted with elements goes to different children
RDDs based on their keys. It often involves data shuffling between the conversion, which
transfers data around the cluster and results in a new stage with a new set of partitions.
Output: The last step is an action (e.g. Count, Collect, Save, Take), which converts
the last RDD into an output to external data sources. It also can be returned as an array or
return the number of elements in the dataset.
4.1.3 Resilient Distributed Datasets
All RDDs available derive from the abstract class RDD either directly or indirectly. This
class comes with a large set of methods that perform operations on the data within the
associated partitions. The basic RDD API considers each data item as a single value
and the extended interface provides additional functions (e.g., PairRDDFunctions), which
explicitly work on key-value pairs.
Spark RDDs support two kinds of operations: transformations and actions. Transfor-
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Table 4.1: Example of transformations
Transformation Meaning
map(func)
Return a new distributed dataset formed by passing each element of the
source through a function func.
filter(func)
Return a new dataset formed by selecting those elements of the source
on which func returns true.
flatMap(func)
Similar to map, but each input item can be mapped to 0 or more output
items (so func should return a Seq rather than a single item).
groupByKey([numTasks])
When called on a dataset of (K, V) pairs, returns a dataset of (K,
Iterable<V>) pairs. Note: If you are grouping in order to perform an
aggregation (such as a sum or average) over each key, using
reduceByKey or aggregateByKey will yield much better performance.
Note: By default, the level of parallelism in the output depends on the
number of partitions of the parent RDD. You can pass an optional
numTasks argument to set a different number of tasks.
reduceByKey(func, [numTasks])
When called on a dataset of (K, V) pairs, returns a dataset of (K, V)
pairs where the values for each key are aggregated using the given
reduce function func, which must be of type (V,V) => V. Like in
groupByKey, the number of reduce tasks is configurable through an
optional second argument.
mations create new datasets from the input, some of them are shown in Table 4.1 (cited
from Spark Programming Guide 1). Transformations are lazily evaluated, in that they
don’t run until an action warrants it. Spark Master/Driver remembers the transformations
applied to an RDD, which is the lineage information. So if a slave machine goes down
and a partition is lost, that partition can easily be reconstructed on some other machines
in the cluster. That is the reason it is called resilient. On the other hand, actions re-
turn a value after executing calculations on the dataset and return pointers to new RDDs,
the commonly-used ones are summarized in Table 4.2 (cited from Spark Programming
Guide).
The sequence of operations and the dependencies between RDDs are shown in the
Figure 4.4. In the example, A to F represent different RDDs and an RDD comprises a
fixed number of partitions (the shaded rectangle), each of which comprises a number of
records. The input from HDFS is represented as RDD[A] and RDD[C]. The map() and
flatMap() transform RDD[A] to RDD[B] where only narrow dependency resides, and it
forms the Stage1. The Stage2 is composed of a map() followed by a reduceByKey(),
1https://spark.apache.org/docs/latest/programming-guide.html
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Table 4.2: Example of actions
Transformation Meaning
reduce(func)
Aggregate the elements of the dataset using a function func (which
takes two arguments and returns one). The function should be
commutative and associative so that it can be computed correctly in
parallel.
collect()
Return all the elements of the dataset as an array at the driver program.
This is usually useful after a filter or other operation that returns a
sufficiently small subset of the data.
count() Return the number of elements in the dataset.
saveAsTextFile(path)
Write the elements of the dataset as a text file (or set of text files) in a
given directory in the local filesystem, HDFS or any other
Hadoop-supported file system. Spark will call toString on each
element to convert it to a line of text in the file.
foreach(func)
Run a function func on each element of the dataset. This is usually
done for side effects such as updating an accumulator variable or
interacting with external storage systems.
which converts RDD[C] to RDD[D] and to RDD[E]. The join() combines RDD[B] and
RDD[E] to RDD[F], where a shuffling happens. In the action, saveAsSequenceFile()
writes RDD[F] as a large sequence file to HDFS.
Once cluster installs, different data partitions is located on separate nodes. User is
able to access all partitions, perform computations and transformations by using RDD as
the handle. Once a part of a RDD or an entire RDD is lost, the system can reconstruct the
data of lost partitions by using lineage information. As a result, Spark is able to recover
automatically from most failures.
Apart from computation by an action each time for the transformed RDD, users may
also ask Spark to persist or cache an RDD in memory, allowing it to be reused efficiently
across parallel operations. It also supports for persisting RDDs on disk, or replicated
across multiple nodes. Besides, the RDD which has been persisted is only available in the
context of an application. To access the RDD in the other application, it has to be saved
to an external source (like HDFS), thus can be shared for multiple applications.
4.1.4 Shuffle in Spark
In traditional MapReduce framework, the shuffle phase is commonly integrated as a part
























Figure 4.4: Spark execution plan.
work and it is non-trivial. A large fraction of the input data must be transferred across the
network, where places significant burden on the OS on both the source and the destination
by requiring many files and network I/Os.
Shuffle phase is a communication between output and input RDDs. The map side of
shuffle is to write out records in a way that all records header to the same reduce side are
grouped together for easy fetching. Shuffle phase in Spark involves two different kinds of
tasks: tasks in the stage producing the shuffle data and tasks in the stage consuming it. In
Hadoop MapReduce, the task producing/writing out shuffled data is the mapper and the
task consuming/reading the shuffle data is the reducer. In Spark, as shown in Figure 4.5,
shuffle stage is consisted of: 1) Shuffle Write produces intermediate files to disk and 2)
Shuffle Read or Shuffle Fetch consuming the data by the next stage of task. The Hadoop
MapReduce and Spark have the same pull model in the shuffling phase, where a map task
writes out data to local disk, and the reduce task sends remote requests to fetch that data.
Shuffle Write and Shuffle Fetch handle the I/O operating on iteration of RDD elements
and it is critical for efficiency. In the paper [30], they identify the bottlenecks of efficiency
for the shuffle phase in the old design , and propose alternatives that solve the observed
problems.
Unlike Hadoop, each map task in Spark writes outs a shuffle file for each reducer and






















Figure 4.5: Spark shuffle phase.
(R) is high, shipping M × R shuffle files to all the reducers could result in significant
overheads. In order to reduce the number of shuffle files, [30] proposes the Consolidation
Shuffle using the number of core (C) in cluster, reducing the number of shuffle files from
M×R to C×R. Nevertheless, it introduces new problems such as overhead in buffer. On
the other hand, Spark also provides a parameter to compress map outputs using specify
compression libraries. It could reduce risk of encountering out-of-memory error. Another
major difference between Hadoop and Spark is on the reduce side, where Spark requires
all shuffled data to fit in memory of the corresponding reducer. Therefore, each reducer
should also maintain a network buffer to store the map outputs.
4.2 Our Design
Since Spark is not a two-stage paradigm as MapReduce, thus we can not design a Mixer
between Map and Reduce stages as we described in Section 3.2.2. In order to preserve
the original semantics, we propose a new Mix stage between a Shuffle Write and Shuffle
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Read, as shown in Figure 4.6. Same as in the design of Map-Mix-Reduce, data is en-
crypted with a private-key encryption scheme, such as AES, and the reason is given in
Section 3.2.3. To clarify the differences between our Mix stage and a normal stage in
Spark, we first give the definition as follows.
Stage: A stage is a set of independent tasks all computing the same function that need
to run as part of a Spark job. The stages are build up by DAGScheduler and each
DAG of tasks is split up into stages at the boundaries where shuffle occurs, and then
the DAGScheduler runs these stages in topological order. A Stage usually fetches its in-
put either from the data storage like HDFS (if it is an input RDD), an existing RDD (if
the stage uses existed cached data), or shuffled outputs (Shuffle Read from the previous
stage). Each Stage can either be a shuffle map stage or a result stage. In a shuffle map
stage, its tasks’ results are input for another stage and Spark tracks the nodes that each
output partition is on. For a result stage, its tasks directly compute the action that initiated
a job (e.g. count(), save(), etc).
A Mix stage is composed of specific mixing functions and it is a variance of a shuffle
map stage. As shown in Figure 4.5, the Mix stage should reside between other two stages,
namely, Stage0 and Stage1, which are associated with its input and output .
Stage0: In this stage, the transformation operations first produce a number of interme-
diate 〈key, value〉 pairs, denoted as
{〈key1, value1〉, 〈key2, value2〉, . . . , 〈keym, valuem〉}
Then it encrypts each pair using probabilistic encryption scheme E under key k and pro-
duces encrypted tuples















Figure 4.6: Spark Mix phase.
Before Shuffle Write, it divides each tuple into one of the partitions {p1, p2, . . . , pn} by
hashing the corresponding encrypted key, where n represents the total number of mixers.
Therefore, the tuples with identical key are distributed to n mixers evenly.
Mix Stage: We denote each mixer an index i, where i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. A mixer col-
lects the data of the corresponding partition {pi} in Stage0, which are some encrypted
key/value pair RDDs, by Shuffle Read. Then mixing function re-encrypts them using
deterministic encryption scheme E′ under a new key k′, and the output is in the form of
list(E′k′(key), E′k′(value)). The deterministic encryption is to ensure the tuples associ-
ated with the same key will be hashed to the same partition, thus will be delivered to the
same worker. This step is followed by a randomly permutation to rearrange the sequence.
After that, the result is shuffled to the next stage by Shuffle Write.
Stage1: This stage can be either a shuffle map stage or a result stage. The input of
this stage is a list of encrypted tuples, that is the output of a mixer. In this stage, it first
decrypts them into a list of 〈key, value〉 tuples in plaintext and then performs user-defined
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transformations to aggregate the pairs associated with the same key. For the tuples with
identical key, it may invoke a reduce operation. Once the action operation triggers, the
output will be written to a shuffle file, external storage or back to the driver.
All these stages can be executed in the trusted execution environment as described in
Section 3.2.3. Due to the limited size of memory in that environment, mixer stages need
to be divided into logS N sub-rounds, with N representing for the total number of tuples a
mixer needs to tackle within this computation and S as the number of tuples (i.e., hundreds
of megabytes) in limited memory. Upon the mixer returns after one sub-round, the output
will be partitioned and copied locally for the next sub-round. Upon return from the last
sub-round, a re-encryption needs to be performed in the trusted environment, which is to






Scala is a modern language built for distributed and parallel systems. It builds on top of
the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) and the mature technology platform, taking advantage
of the platform’s robust tools and libraries. It also provides a consistent object-functional
approach in the small and in the large, on a single multicore node and across a cluster of
nodes. In Scala we can pass in functions defined inline, references to methods, or static
functions and they needs to be serializable.
Spark code is written in the Scala, and applications for Spark are often written in
Scala as well. Scala’s functional programming is ideal for invoking data processing to
build sophisticated flows from basic building blocks, hiding the complexity of processing
huge data sets. Spark has its own version of the Scala interpreter, which is convenient for
programmer to test short snippets of code.
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5.1.2 Typical Examples
In this section, we list three typical examples commonly used in MapReduce computation:
WordCount, PageRank and Grep. We explain how functional approach is used in those
data processing for our design, and explain the detail. Our implementation of the Mix
Stage is composed of several steps shown in the following. The code is in Scala and each







In the first map(), AES Enc( ) encrypts each key-value tuple by private-key AES.
Alternatively, we also could deploy other cryptosystem that facilitates re-randomisation
of the ciphertext without knowledge of the secret key, for example, ElGamal or Universal
Re-encryption, which is demonstrated in [36]. In order to aggregate all the tuples into one
mixer, the second map() is followed where each tuple is converted into the identical key
(e.g., ”all”) with the tuple itself as the value. After reduceByKey() calls on the dataset of
key-value pairs, it returns a new list of pairs where the values are aggregated using the
given reduce function and here is the concatenation of values in the form of string with
the key ”all”. In order to restore the original values, they are separated by ”; ”.
Different from map(), flatMap() maps each input item to 0 or more output items in
sequence. The Mix( ) function first transfers the string of value into a sequence of tuples,
and then performs re-encryption and permutation for each key-value pair. Note that the
re-encryption should be deterministic in order to group the tuples with same key in the
next stage. The next stage begins with a groupByKey(), and it returns a dataset of pairs
consisting of a key and its list of values. This operation yields good performance if the
grouping is in order to perform an aggregation (such as a sum or average) over each key.
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The final map() is to decrypt the ciphertext and it is optional based on the user-defined
operations in the next stage.
We rewrite three Spark-based jobs running with our Mix Stage and evaluate their
performance. The examples cover a wide range of data-intensive tasks with different
features: shuffle intensive (WordCount), iterative (PageRank) and map intensive (Grep).
WordCount As popularized by Hadoop, In Spark, one common data flow pattern is
MapReduce and the typical example is WordCount. Spark can implement MapReduce
flows easily by several lines. In the original Spark WordCount, it combines the flatMap(),
map() and reduceByKey() transformations to compute the per-word counts in the file as
an RDD of (String, Int) pairs and use the collect() action to collect the word counts in
shell. The code lines below with comments compose the stage of Mix (same as follows).








.reduceByKey((a, b) => a + b)
//.map(AES Dec( ))
.collect()
PageRank One of the most popular method one can use to determine how important
a website is by PageRank. It is a good example of a more complex algorithm, since its
multiple stages of map and reduce. Compared with others, PageRank in Spark benefits
from its in-memory caching, supporting multiple iterations over the same data. The basic
idea is to give pages ranks/scores based on the links to them, that is, the page links from
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many other pages or a high-rank page will get a high rank. It is noted that there are two
shuffle phases in the original algorithm, thus we need to insert two Mix stages for each.
val links = lines.map{ s =>











var ranks = links.mapValues(v => 1.0)
for (i <− 1 to iters) {
val contribs = links.join(ranks).values.flatMap{
case (urls, rank) =>
val size = urls.size







.reduceByKey((a, b) => a + b)




Grep This job takes a word pattern or a keyword and searches the dataset for its oc-
currence. Each map instance calls a filter that returns the lines of words which contain
this keyword. Count() action runs indicating the number of matches of the line. Unlike
WordCount, this job does not shuffle a lot of data, and most computation is spent at the











We conduct our experiments in a cluster on the Deterlab 2, which is an open exerimental
facility funded by the US National Science Foundation and Department of Homeland Se-
curity and hosted by USC/ISI and UC Berkeley, with the goal of advancing cybersecurity
research and education. Our cloud consist of 15 instances located in US. All instances
run Ubuntu12.04, and each server has 1 octa-core Intel CPU 1.6GHz, 250GB hard drive,
16GB memory and 1GB Ethernet cards. The bandwidth between these instances is set as
100MB. Though our cluster is small, our dataset size is quite modest and hence matches
the cluster. Unless stated otherwise, the results presented below are running with 15 mixer
stages in parallel reserving for mixing. We use simple standalone deploy mode of Spark,
i.e., simply place a compiled version of Spark for each node on the cluster.
2http://deter-project.org
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Spark settings can be configured through environment variables, which are read from
the conf/spark-env.sh script. It is sourced when running local Spark applications or sub-
mission scripts. Note that conf/spark-env.sh does not exist by default when Spark is in-
stalled, but user needs to copy conf/spark-env.sh.template to create it. There are options
for setting up the Spark standalone cluster scripts, such as number of cores to use on each
machine and maximum memory.
Spark properties control most application settings and are configured separately for
each application. For instance, if you would like to run the same application with dif-
ferent masters or different amounts of memory. These properties can be set directly on a
SparkConf passed to your SparkContext. SparkConf allows user to configure some of the
common properties (e.g. master URL and application name). Spark property values can
be explicitly specified through spark-defaults.conf, SparkConf, or the command line. For
all other configuration properties, you can assume the reasonable default value is used.
The properties are categorised into Application Properties, Runtime Environment, Shuf-
fle Behavior, Spark UI, Compression and Serialization, Execution Behavior, Networking,
Scheduling, Dynamic Allocation, Security, Encryption and Spark Streaming.
5.2.2 Results
Table 5.1 shows the total running time and the amount of bytes being shuffled for different
jobs. It can be seen that the running time does not have positive correlation directly with
the input size as well as the shuffled bytes, but relevant to the feature of job. Page rank has
the minimum input size (10M) but takes the longest time (almost 22 minutes) to process
the data, due to its computational intension. WordCount has the largest amount (33.4M)
of encrypted data shuffled in between the Mixer stage, which conforms to its shuffle
intensive property. Grep runs fast over 1.25GB data and has less shuffled bytes which is
according to the counts indicating number of matches in the encrypted line. Thus it can
be classified as map-intensive job.
Compare the running time of the unmodified job with the ones which have mixers in
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WordCount 50MB 43.1 502.4 389.8 33.4
PageRank 10MB3 58.1 1852.8 1338.1 17.3
Grep 1.25GB 16.8 73.2 61.9 6.94
different numbers, we find the latter is dramatically increasing. Among which, the most
obvious one is the PageRank job, it takes 20-30x in running time than that of original job.
This is because the extra shuffle phase introduced by the Mixer stage, as well as the re-
encryption and permutation operations. In PageRank, it is also relevant to the number of
iterations, which influences the precision of the results. The table also shows the running
time with different number of mixers (i.e., 5 and 15) working in parallel. We can conclude
the increasing in the mixer tasks leads to reduction in the total time significantly. For
instance, in the WordCount job, the running time with 5 mixers is almost 1.5x than that
with 15 mixers.
3runs for 10 iterations




With the development of the cloud computing technique, data security and privacy has
been recognized as a major concern for cloud service customers. While there are various
benefits for them to outsource data storage and computation to the cloud, the lost of full
control of the remote physical resources results in their hesitation in moving to the cloud
server. Existing solutions on encrypted domain processing, trusted computing and data
segregation show their limitations and impractical in implementation. By now, there is
no existed solutions which is qualified for a general-purpose, cost-efficient and scalable
cloud computing infrastructure.
This work focuses on concealing the linkage information of the dataflow between
source and destination in the setting of MapReduce framework. The data delivered be-
tween map and reduce tasks is reordered and re-encrypted by mixing functions in batch,
so as to hide the correlation for a unit of data in the output batch with the input batch. In
this way, the semi-honest cloud server is unable to infer the sensitive information such as
the data distribution in the source side. The challenge is to design a mixer as an efficient
and secure module in between two tasks. To extend it to a more general computation
framework like Spark, we implement a mixer stage in line with its task mechanism. The
expressive style of functional programming used in Scala makes it easy to understand the
features of a mixer.
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Our evaluation is performed on the remote cloud servers located in the US. The re-
sults show the overhead by adding the mixer tasks for three different types of jobs. It
is concluded that the running time not only depend on input size, shuffled bytes and the
number of mixer tasks, but also the properties inherently of each job. We can also draw a
conclusion that the more mixer tasks running in parallel, the less overhead the system has.
On the other hand, it has been proved that the ideal mixer provides strong guarantees in
anonymization. The tradeoff between efficiency and security depends on the requirement
of the users and it is worthwhile to be studied further.
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